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Abstract: The United Kingdom (UK) is well known for the single-member plurality (SMP) or, 
more colloquially, the first-past-the-post, electoral system. Devolution of power in the late 
twentieth century, however, introduced new bodies and positions with new electoral systems, 
with the total reaching six. These consisted of three majoritarian systems – SMP, block vote, 
and supplementary vote – as well as three proportional systems – single transferable vote, 
mixed-member proportional representation, and regional list proportional representation. 
Sample election results are presented and examined. Despite the presence of several different 
electoral systems and party systems in the UK with the development of multilevel governance, 
SMP appears to be entrenched at Westminster, just as SMP systems abroad have, in most 
cases, also resisted change. 
Keywords: block vote; mixed-member proportional; proportional representation; single-
member plurality; single transferable vote; supplementary vote; United Kingdom 
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Introduction: Continuity and change 
The United Kingdom (UK) is well known for what many political scientists call the single-
member plurality (SMP) electoral system1. More commonly, if colloquially, known as ‘first-
past-the-post’ – a racing reference that highlights the winner-take-all nature of this 
majoritarian system – SMP is used to elect the House of Commons, the lower house of 
Parliament. This system is used in many other countries, typically as a result of having some 
experience with British colonialism, and SMP has been the subject of controversy in a 
number of the countries using it, not least the UK itself, where the system has been the subject 
of intense criticism and even a referendum.  
 While SMP is strongly identified with its use in the UK, several other electoral 
systems have also been used for other bodies or positions in the UK, thanks to the process of 
decentralization (called ‘devolution’) in the late 1990s. As a result of the transfer of power 
from Westminster to the constituent nations outside England (Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland), as well as to local and regional authorities within England, there were six different 
electoral systems operating in different parts of the UK by the year 2000. This chapter will 
examine all of these systems, not simply SMP, whose historical developments from medieval 
times through the twentieth century have been explored in detail elsewhere (Bogdanor 1981; 
Carstairs 1980; Farrell 2011; Hart 1992; Mitchell 2005; Norris 1995). The main observation 
is that despite the presence of a multitude of different electoral systems and party systems in 
the UK since the expansion of multilevel governance, SMP has persisted at Westminster, 
seemingly entrenched and immune to contagion from the other electoral systems in use in the 
UK. 
Three of the UK’s electoral systems in the early twenty-first century were 
majoritarian: SMP; its predecessor, the block vote (BV, or multiple non-transferable vote), 
used for council elections in some English and Welsh local authority areas; and the more 
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modern supplementary vote (SV, or contingent vote), used to elect the mayors of some 
English cities, as well as Police and Crime Commissioners in England and Wales. The other 
three electoral systems were forms of proportional representation (PR): the single transferable 
vote (STV), used for most elections in Northern Ireland as well as for local elections in 
Scotland; regional list PR for the election of Great Britain’s Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) when the UK was part of the European Union (EU); and the mixed-
member proportional (MMP) system (usually called the ‘additional member system’ in the 
UK), used to elect the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the London 
Assembly.  
 This institutional diversity at the regional level has not led to electoral system change 
at Westminster, where a multiparty system has persisted despite the use of an electoral system 
better suited to a two-party system. While some observers, like Patrick Dunleavy, have 
correctly pointed out that the UK has made a transition from two-party politics to multiparty 
politics, with multiple party systems existing at the various levels of governance since 
devolution, the expectation that ‘some form of transition of representation at Westminster 
seems inevitable as existing multi-party politics develops further’ (Dunleavy 2005: 505) had 
not been realised by the second decade of the twenty-first century. As international 
comparisons show, multiparty systems and SMP can co-exist, even at the electoral district 
level, in defiance of Duverger’s ‘Law’ (Duverger 1954): Canada (Gaines 1999) and India 
(Diwaker 2007) feature prominently as examples of countries with SMP systems resistant to 
reform. The case of the UK under multilevel governance reinforces this observation. Rather 
than a situation in which electoral rules at the various levels of governance in multilevel 
systems are the same or significantly influence one another, it appears that in the case of the 
UK, each level of governance constitutes its own political system, with only occasional 
influence on the other levels.  
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 This chapter will explore the development of the six UK electoral systems, looking at 
the two waves of electoral reform attempts and their achievements. Examples of recent 
elections under the various systems will be provided to illustrate how these systems work in 
practice, as well as how proportional they are and what kind of party systems are associated 
with them. Issues and controversies associated with these systems will also be examined, 
including the importance of the constituency role of elected representatives in the UK. The 
story of the UK’s electoral systems, it will be shown, is one of continuity and change. 
 
Waves of electoral reform 
There were two waves of electoral reform attempts in British history (Norris 1995: 69). The 
first wave took place in the late nineteenth century, at the time British politics began to 
democratize. As demands for greater inclusion grew, the political parties gradually extended 
the franchise to more and more citizens, raising questions about how this process would affect 
the parties’ fortunes. Contrary to popular belief, most constituencies (electoral districts) 
returned two members by the plurality method – BV, in which the winners were the two 
candidates with the most votes in contests where each voter had two votes – to the House of 
Commons throughout most of its existence (Hart 1992: 5). Therefore, the SMP system is 
actually an electoral innovation away from BV and not an ‘ancient’ feature of British political 
history, or at least not of English political history – Ireland, Scotland, and Wales did have, for 
the most part, single-member constituencies, but these constituted a small portion of seats in 
the House of Commons (Carstairs 1980: 191).  
 The shift to a single-member constituency norm came as the two major parties, the 
Conservatives and the Liberals, competed over the extension of the franchise and the 
redrawing of constituency boundaries at a time of great social and economic change in the 
UK. Part of the rationale for single-member constituencies was the protection of minorities, 
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especially the privileged minority that feared being swamped by the enfranchisement of more 
and more working-class men (Norris 1995: 69). With the 1867 Reform Act, there was a brief 
experiment in minority protection with the semi-proportional ‘limited vote’ system in which 
voters had one vote less than the number of members to be elected in a small number of three- 
and four-member constituencies (Carstairs 1980: 192), but these were seen as failing to 
protect minorities and abolished with the introduction of a primarily single-member 
constituency system in the 1885 Redistribution of Seats Act, with Prime Minister William 
Gladstone indicating that he was satisfied that minorities would be protected by the new 
system that would accompany the previous year’s franchise extension (Hart 1992: 113-114). 
Eventually the Liberals came to support STV, but this shift came too late as they went into 
decline as the Labour Party rose and ultimately replaced them as a major party. Both the 
Conservatives and Labour came to support SMP. 
The UK did, therefore, undertake electoral reform in the late nineteenth century, 
shifting from a mainly BV system to a mainly SMP system, with a brief experiment with the 
limited vote system. Unlike most other European countries, however, the UK did not move to 
PR, though it was proposed during this era. John Stuart Mill and Thomas Hare advocated 
STV, a preferential system in which voters would rank candidates numerically, rather than a 
party list system, which came to predominate across the rest of Europe. STV failed to impress 
most of the political class, which saw the system as an overly complicated product of naïve, 
idealistic reformers who looked down on party politicians to such an extent that their system 
was designed to enhance the chances of independent candidates and allow voters to choose 
between candidates of the same party, something most party leaders would like to avoid (Hart 
1992: 267-268). While STV’s advocates were ultimately unsuccessful in the UK, they did 
help to lay the foundations of this system in Ireland. The president of Britain’s Proportional 
Representation Society (now the Electoral Reform Society) recommended STV as a way to 
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reassure the Protestant minority in the event of Home Rule when he visited in 1911, and this 
recommendation made its way into the 1922 constitution of the Irish Free State without 
controversy (Carstairs 1980: 203).  
A second wave of attempts to reform the British electoral system began in the 1970s 
as the character of the British party system became more pluralistic, which was particularly 
apparent with the results of the two general elections of 1974. The two-party system of the 
mid-twentieth century was giving way to one in which the Liberals were gaining support after 
their replacement by a rising Labour Party in the earlier part of the century, and where 
Scottish and Welsh nationalists were competing more successfully in the ‘Celtic Fringe’. The 
deteriorating political situation in Northern Ireland, whose SMP-elected parliament had been 
suspended by Westminster, led to the introduction of STV for local council and European 
Parliament elections in an effort to reassure the minority community that it was going to be 
represented more equitably (Farrell 2011: 29). Discussions about the possibility of devolution 
for Scotland and Wales in the 1970s also facilitated interest in alternate electoral systems, but 
PR was opposed by the Conservatives and most in the Labour Party, though the latter party 
did show some interest in PR and even more interest in the majoritarian alternative vote (AV) 
system, which requires voters to rank candidates preferentially in single-member 
constituencies. The Liberals and their successor party, the Liberal Democrats, supported STV, 
which has also been the preference of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru, the 
Party of Wales. 
Nevertheless, the two major parties would normally benefit the most from SMP, 
gaining seats as an increasing number of voters supported minor parties that failed to win 
seats. In the 1950s and 1960s, Conservative and Labour candidates won around 90 per cent of 
the vote at general elections, but this dropped to about 75 per cent in the 1970s and the 
following two decades, and hit 65 per cent at the 2010 election, yet the two major parties still 
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managed to win about 90 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons (Clark 2012: 9-10). 
Labour’s long spell in the political wilderness during Conservatives’ 18 continuous years in 
power (1979-1997) did lead to some questioning of the electoral system, with the party’s 
Working Group on Electoral Systems, chaired by political philosophy professor Raymond 
Plant, recommending the majoritarian SV for the House of Commons, MMP for the Scottish 
Parliament, and regional list PR for elections to the European Parliament and a reformed 
House of Lords in its 1993 report (Plant 1995).  
The Labour victory under Tony Blair in 1997 brought an end to Conservative rule for 
13 years and prompted a major increase in the number of electoral systems in the UK, which 
would double from three to six, with serious consideration given to changing the system used 
to elect the House of Commons. Roy Jenkins was charged with leading a commission that 
would investigate alternatives to SMP and make a recommendation that Labour’s 1997 
manifesto said would be put to the voters in a referendum. Jenkins recommended what he 
called ‘AV Top-up’, a largely AV-based system with a small compensatory tier of party list 
seats (15 to 20 per cent of the total) to be allocated in small electoral regions, meaning that 
while the system would technically have been a form of MMP, its compensatory ability 
would have been so limited that it might have been better described as a diluted majoritarian 
system (Lundberg 2007a: 479). Ultimately the system was never put to a referendum. 
Electoral reform came back onto the agenda after the 2010 election when the 
Conservatives formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, a party that had 
advocated STV for decades. The Conservatives agreed to a referendum on the electoral 
system for the House of Commons, but the voters would be offered the non-proportional AV 
as the alternative, rather than STV or some other PR option. Labour had promised a 
referendum on AV in its manifesto, so the system was on the table, with the Liberal 
Democrats probably calculating that despite its majoritarian nature, AV was potentially better 
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for the party than SMP, provided that a lot of second preferences could be won from the 
supporters of other parties (Curtice 2013: 217). Though the Conservatives agreed to the 
referendum and were presumably not worried about the potential impact of AV, they 
campaigned against change and seemed to reap the benefits of their own popularity while that 
of their smaller partner declined; ultimately, nearly 68 per cent of those who voted (on the 
low turnout of less than 42 per cent) opposed AV (Curtice 2013: 220).  
 
The six UK electoral systems in use in the early twenty-first century 
Despite the failure of the AV referendum, the UK was using six different electoral systems in 
the early twenty-first century (Table 1). One – the regional list PR system used to elect Great 
Britain’s MEPs – would be eliminated as the UK left the EU and its MEPs left the European 
Parliament. The remaining five would include three examples of the majoritarian family of 
electoral systems and two from the proportional family, though residents of England outside 
London would not use any form of PR voting once the UK left the EU.  
The following sections will describe the systems, noting their origins and providing 
examples of results with analysis, which will include voter turnout (which is calculated by the 
UK Electoral Commission as a proportion of the total electorate, not the voting age 
population), the number and percentage of women elected, the effective number of 
parliamentary parties calculated by the author according to Laakso and Taagepera (1979), and 
the Gallagher (1991) Least Squares index of disproportionality (the higher the number, the 
greater the disproportionality when translating votes into seats), calculated by the author using 
data from all parties (and candidates in the London Mayor election) winning at least one per 
cent of the vote or one seat, with independent (non-party) candidates not counted. In STV 
elections, the index of disproportionality calculation uses first preference votes as the basis of 
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party preference, while the same determination is made using the party vote in MMP elections, 
according to Lijphart (2012: 145). 
Table 1 about here 
Single-member plurality 
SMP for House of Commons elections accompanied mass enfranchisement in the late 
nineteenth century, as described above. The system has also been used for local council 
elections in England and Wales and was used for the House of Commons of the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland after it switched from STV in the late 1920s until it was suspended and then 
abolished by Westminster in the early 1970s. Scotland’s local councils were elected by SMP 
until 2007, when the Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition government in Scotland introduced 
STV. 
  When comparing votes and seats on a partisan basis, SMP election results often 
display high levels of disproportionality, particularly in multiparty systems. This is the case in 
the two House of Commons election results displayed in Table 2, where the 2010 result 
(Table 2A) reveals a Gallagher disproportionality index of 14.9, with 15.0 for 2015 (Table 
2B). The effective number of parliamentary parties is 2.6 in 2010 and 2.5 in 2015. A crucial 
difference between the two election outcomes is the ‘hung parliament’ in 2010 – the rare 
event at Westminster since the Second World War in which no party wins a majority of seats, 
leading to the first coalition government since that war. The Conservatives came close to a 
majority of seats on 36 per cent of the vote, but rather than forming a minority government, 
they went into a formal coalition with the centrist Liberal Democrats. The Conservatives 
managed to win a small majority (on just under 37 per cent of the vote) in 2015 after a big 
drop in support for their coalition partner. While Labour’s support actually rose more than 
one percentage point, its seat share dropped four points. 
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Results in Table 2 show how the two major parties benefit from SMP, winning a far 
larger share of seats than their vote share, while the medium-sized Liberal Democrats in 2010 
manage to win less than nine per cent of the seats on their 23 per cent of the vote (Table 2A). 
Smaller parties typically do even worse if their support is geographically diffuse, with the UK 
Independence Party winning only one of the 650 seats for its nearly 13 per cent of the vote in 
2015 (Table 2B), but territorially concentrated support in the same election gave the SNP a 
seat share that was nearly twice its vote share, with the party winning nearly all of Scotland’s 
seats. Territorial concentration also helped the very small, regionally based parties from 
Wales and Northern Ireland win a roughly proportional share of seats. Voter turnout was 
about the same at both elections, at 65 per cent in 2010 and 66 per cent in 2015, but there was 
a big increase in the proportion of women in the House of Commons – a rise from 22 per cent 
in 2010 to 29 per cent in 2015. 
 




In this variant of plurality voting, there are multimember constituencies in which voters cast 
as many votes are there are candidates to be elected, with the winners being, for example, the 
top three candidates in a three-member constituency. Votes cannot be cumulated upon a 
single candidate, so the multimember nature of the system simply enhances the 
disproportionality typical of the SMP system because voters tend to cast all of their votes as a 
block for candidates of the same party, who often take all the seats, meaning that the 
majoritarian effect of this system is magnified when compared to SMP (Farrell 2011: 40). BV 
is sometimes called the multiple non-transferable vote (Electoral Reform Society 2016). 
 While BV was used to elect two members from most English parliamentary 
constituencies from the medieval period to the nineteenth century, SMP came to replace BV 
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as the franchise was extended and became the predominant system for elections to the House 
of Commons after 1885. BV was retained for some local council elections in England and 
Wales, however, and is perhaps best known for its use in London borough elections, where 
most wards (constituencies) elect three members. Table 3 provides two examples of how BV 
worked in London in 2014. In the first example, one party – Labour – has won all of the 
council’s seats on 69 per cent of the vote (Barking and Dagenham, Table 3A).  
In other cases, local elections can see independent candidates or local parties succeed 
in spite of the majoritarian nature of BV. This was the case for Tower Hamlets First in the 
borough of Tower Hamlets (Table 3B). In this example, Tower Hamlets First was the main 
challenger to Labour, coming in a close second, and while the Conservatives managed to win 
a nearly proportional share of seats, the smaller parties won none, so the level of 
disproportionality is rather high, at 9.8 on the Gallagher index, though not nearly as high as in 
Barking and Dagenham, at 25.4. Voter turnout was 36 and a half per cent in Barking and 
Dagenham and 47 per cent in Tower Hamlets, while Barking and Dagenham saw a greater 
proportion of women elected (39 per cent) than was the case in Tower Hamlets (24 per cent). 
 




This majoritarian system came to be used in the UK as a result of the Labour Party’s Plant 
Report, which recommended it for House of Commons elections. A Labour member of 
Parliament, Dale Campbell Savours, claimed to have invented the system, though it was used 
in Queensland (where it was known as the contingent vote) for state elections up to the mid-
twentieth century and has been used to elect Sri Lanka’s president since 1982 (Reilly 1997: 
95). While this preferential, majoritarian system may superficially resemble Australia’s AV, it 
does not allow the full expression of a voter’s preferences, which can make very different 
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outcomes possible (Reilly 1997: 100). Despite receiving significant criticism in the UK when 
it was proposed in the 1990s (Reilly 1997: 95), the system has been used for mayoral 
elections in the English cities and boroughs that have chosen to use it, as well as for the 
election of Police and Crime Commissioners in England and Wales.  
 With SV, voters may indicate up to two candidate preferences, so there are two 
columns on the ballot paper, allowing voters to put one cross (x) in the first column for their 
first choice and another cross in the second column for their second choice. If no candidate 
wins over 50 per cent of the first preference vote, all candidates other than the top two are 
eliminated, with any second preference votes on their ballots for the remaining two candidates 
added to their totals. The candidate with the majority of votes, after the distribution of second 
preferences, wins. Direct elections for London Mayor have taken place since 2000, and Table 
4 shows how the system worked at the 2016 election, in which Sadiq Khan won easily on 
nearly 57 per cent of the vote after the transfer of second preferences, with a voter turnout of 
45 per cent. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Single transferable vote 
Previously used for some of the university seats in the UK Parliament before the abolition of 
plural voting (giving university graduates more than one vote) in 1948, STV was used for 
elections to Northern Ireland’s House of Commons after the Irish Free State became 
independent from the UK in the early 1920s. Not long afterwards, the system was replaced by 
SMP and STV was not restored for use in Northern Ireland until the 1970s, when local 
elections were held under this proportional system to represent minorities more effectively 
than the SMP and BV systems that the Unionist government had reinstated for local councils 
in 1922 after a brief use of STV (Coakley 2008: 169). Eventually, the creation of the Northern 
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Ireland Assembly by the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement meant STV would be used for this 
body as well. STV was also used to elect Northern Ireland’s three MEPs and was introduced 
to elect Scotland’s local councils from 2007 as part of a coalition agreement between Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats in the early years of Scottish devolution.  
The top choice of many British electoral reformers, particularly those affiliated with 
the Electoral Reform Society, and the preference of the Liberal Party and its successor, the 
Liberal Democrats, STV appeals not only because of its proportionality, but also because of 
its preferential nature, allowing voters the freedom to rank any or all candidates in order of 
preference. This freedom can cause problems for parties that would prefer to get their top 
candidates into assemblies, for which a closed list system would be preferable. Parties would 
probably also prefer a system that is less kind to independent candidates than STV. 
This preferential PR system is strongly associated with its use in the Republic of 
Ireland – Malta is the only other country that uses the system for its lower or only national 
legislative chamber. In Ireland, STV has periodically been reviewed, with critics arguing that 
the system facilitates too much constituency service, distracting deputies from their other 
roles and potentially reducing party cohesion (All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution 2002: 20). Irish voters rank candidates in order of preference within 
parliamentary constituencies that elect three, four, or five deputies, and because larger parties 
hope to win more than one of the available seats, they will normally nominate more than one 
candidate. Because candidates from the same party are competing, they must differentiate 
themselves on the basis of personal characteristics, rather than party policy, leading to the 
problems cited above. Defenders of STV argue that demands for constituency service are high 
around the world, regardless of electoral system (Gallagher and Komito 2005: 258-9), and 
that in Ireland, ‘it would be disingenuous to suppose that somehow this would dissipate if the 
electoral system were changed’ (Farrell 2011: 147). 
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Table 5 shows how STV works in Northern Ireland Assembly elections, where 18 six-
member constituencies are used to elect the 108-member body. There was a multiparty system 
(effective number of parliamentary parties 4.3 in 2016), and the largest party was somewhat 
overrepresented, but the others, including the smallest parties, won seat shares that were quite 
proportional to their vote shares. The index of disproportionality was 5.1 for the 2016 election, 
while the voter turnout was 54 per cent. The proportion of women elected was 27 and a half 
per cent. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Regional party list proportional representation 
The UK used SMP to elect its MEPs coming from Great Britain – Northern Ireland’s were 
elected via STV – until a regional list PR system was introduced for the 1999 European 
Parliament election. The Labour government elected in 1997 introduced PR because all other 
EU members used PR systems to elect their MEPs and the European Parliament was bound 
by treaty to have a ‘common electoral system’, a fact pointed out in the 1993 Plant Report. 
Closed party lists were used, meaning that voters could not indicate any preference for a 
particular candidate. There had been support for opening up the lists to allow voters ‘to 
change the order of candidates on the lists’ (Lamport 1995: 20), but the Labour government 
implemented a closed-list system, even though the House of Lords had amended the original 
legislation to allow voters to choose individual candidates on party lists, an amendment that 
Home Secretary Jack Straw somewhat misleadingly said gave voters less choice when he 
reversed it (BBC News 1998). 
The results from the 2014 election in Table 6 are from Great Britain only; Northern 
Ireland’s three STV-elected MEPs included one each from the Democratic Unionist Party, 
Sinn Fein, and the Ulster Unionist Party. A multiparty system was present (effective number 
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of parliamentary parties is 3.6), with the populist, anti-political establishment UK 
Independence Party (Abedi and Lundberg 2009) – whose main goal was to pull the UK out of 
the EU – winning first place, beating the two major parties, with the pro-EU Liberal 
Democrats winning only one seat in this low-turnout (34 per cent) election. The index of 
disproportionality was 7.7 in the context of small- and medium-sized electoral regions, while 
the proportion of women elected was relatively high, at 41 per cent. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
 
Mixed-member proportional representation 
 
MMP is a mixed electoral system because in most places using it, voters cast two votes – one 
for a constituency candidate, and one for a party, so that representatives are elected in two 
different ways. The constituency candidates are typically elected by SMP while another tier of 
candidates is usually elected from regional or nationwide party lists. In an MMP system, the 
party list tier of representatives is elected in a compensatory way, so that the proportion of 
seats on a partisan basis in the region or nation overall – adding both constituency and list 
seats together – is roughly equivalent to the proportion of the list vote obtained by each party. 
Most mixed systems around the world are not PR systems because the two tiers of seats are 
either parallel – with the party list tier independent of and offering no compensation for the 
results of the constituency tier – or (much less often) there is a transfer votes from the 
constituency tier but only a weak level of compensation in the list tier that does not depend on 
actual seats won by parties in the constituency tier. These systems are often called ‘mixed-
member majoritarian’ (MMM) and can be found worldwide, particularly in Asia (including 
Japan), Russia and other post-Soviet countries, as well as in a number of African countries 
(Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). 
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In the UK, Labour chose MMP for elections to the Scottish Parliament (and eventually 
the National Assembly for Wales and the London Assembly) when developing its plans for 
Scottish devolution in the 1990s. In Scotland and Wales, several regions are used for the 
allocation of party list members, while London has only one citywide region. The Scottish 
Parliament consists of 129 members, with 73 elected in single-member constituencies by 
SMP and the remaining 56 elected via closed party lists (or, in rare instances, as independent 
candidates) in eight electoral regions, each containing an average of nine constituencies while 
each region elects seven regional members. In Wales, the National Assembly consists of 60 
members, with each of the five regions electing only four regional members, making it 
difficult to compensate for results from the average of eight constituencies in each region. The 
London Assembly is a far smaller body, with only 25 members elected from its 14 
constituencies and from Londonwide party lists; a five per cent legal threshold applies in 
London, though no legal threshold exists for the other MMP-elected bodies. 
Results from MMP elections in Scotland and Wales show that Scottish Parliament 
elections are typically more proportional in outcome than their Welsh counterparts. In 
Scotland, there is a disproportionality index of 7.4 in 2011 and 5.5 in 2016 (Table 7), while 
the index is 10.4 in 2011 and 13.0 in 2016 in Wales (Table 8). Nevertheless, the SNP won a 
majority of seats in 2011 (Table 7A), while Labour has never quite managed this feat in 
Wales. The effective number of parties has been around three in both nations’ assemblies, 
though voter turnout has been somewhat higher in Scotland, at around 50 per cent, while 
Welsh turnout has been closer to 40 per cent. Both bodies have managed to elect a larger 
proportion of women than the House of Commons, with the Scottish Parliament over 30 per 
cent and the National Assembly for Wales over 40 per cent female in membership. 
 
Tables 7 and 8 about here 
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While MMP is based upon the West German electoral system introduced in the late 
1940s, it was New Zealand that coined the term ‘mixed-member proportional’ for this system, 
which replaced the country’s SMP system in 1996 after two referendums on the subject. 
MMP is now the preferred name for this electoral system used by political scientists 
worldwide (Farrell 2011; Lijphart 2012; Reynolds et al. 2005; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). 
In the UK, the Hansard Society used the term ‘additional member system’ (AMS) back in the 
1970s when it proposed an alternative to SMP for the House of Commons based upon the 
German system (Blake Commission 1976). This is unfortunate because the term MMP clearly 
distinguishes this mixed system from the non-proportional MMM, while AMS could refer to 
either version and does not indicate that the version used for elections in Scotland, Wales and 
London is actually a compensatory proportional one.  
The term AMS is also problematic because it labels list-elected candidates as 
‘additional members’, implying that they are somehow a secondary by-product of the process 
by virtue of being added on after the election of constituency candidates in order to top up the 
numbers – indeed, the term ‘top-up members’ is sometimes seen in the media and even in 
academic publications from British authors (Dunleavy and Margetts 2001). This kind of 
value-laden terminology can lead to a sense of inequality between constituency and regional 
members, a problem that was noted in a review of the Scottish MMP system, where the 
authors recommended that the term ‘mixed member system’ be used instead of AMS and that 
‘additional’ members be called ‘regional’ members (Arbuthnott 2006: 4).  
 
Experiences with PR electoral systems in the UK 
 
The UK’s PR systems have led to results that are not highly proportional, though it would not 
be accurate to describe them as ‘semi-proportional’. Aside from getting categories confused – 
there are electoral formulas, such as MMM, that fit into the semi-proportional classification 
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(Lijphart 2012: 133) – this label seems to assume that PR systems are perfectly proportional, 
which is not the case. MMP elections to the National Assembly for Wales struggle the most, 
with high disproportionality index values (10.4 and 13.0 for the elections in Table 8), thanks 
to the small number of regional members available to compensate for constituency results, but 
the Scottish Parliament’s disproportionality index values of 7.4 and 5.5 (Table 7) under MMP 
are similar to those of list PR-using Greece (7.88), Spain (7.28), Uruguay (6.05), Norway 
(4.53), and Portugal (4.43), according to Lijphart’s analysis of 1945-2010 election results 
(2012: 150). STV in Northern Ireland (5.1, Table 5) shows disproportionality similar to that 
of the Republic of Ireland (3.93 in Lijphart 2012: 150), while British European Parliament 
results with list PR display higher levels of disproportionality, at 7.7 in 2014 (Table 6). 
Much of the UK’s electoral system innovation took place with MMP. Despite its 
relatively rare worldwide occurrence, MMP has been found to be the experts’ top choice, 
beating STV into second place (Bowler et al. 2005). Although MMP may be popular among 
political scientists, there has been some controversy in the UK surrounding the competition 
between constituency and regional members over constituency service, with some 
constituency members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) and Welsh Assembly Members 
(AMs) complaining about being ‘shadowed’ by regional members trying to enhance their 
name recognition among constituents to help with their efforts to stand as local constituency 
candidates at the next election. This competition over constituency service could be good for 
British constituents, reducing the safety of seats for constituency incumbents and improving 
the responsiveness of representative democracy (Lundberg 2006).  
Tensions between constituency and regional representatives are far less common in 
Germany, where most people do not distinguish between the two different types of 
representatives (Burkett 1985: 130), largely because dual candidacy – the ability of candidates 
to stand in both constituencies and on party lists simultaneously – is common (Jesse 1988: 
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120; Massicotte 2004: 73). Candidates losing in constituency contests can be elected through 
party lists when they are high enough on their lists and then usually set up offices in 
constituencies where they were defeated, so shadowing of constituency-elected candidates is 
typical and constituents cannot tell who was ‘directly’ elected in the constituency (Burkett 
1985: 129-30). In New Zealand, which has used MMP since it replaced SMP in 1996, dual 
candidacy has been more controversial, probably due to the long history of SMP, but a 2012 
review of MMP found that a majority of public submissions supported the retention of dual 
candidacy, which the New Zealand Electoral Commission recommended be retained (NZ 
Electoral Commission 2012: 37-38). 
The different electoral routes for representatives elected under MMP have caused 
some concern in Britain, however, partially due to the public’s familiarity with SMP and the 
constituency role of representatives elected under it, and partially for partisan reasons. The 
issue of accountability – to constituents or to the party organisations that rank the closed party 
lists used in MMP – has been raised by some politicians and journalists who seem to believe 
that party list-elected members of the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales 
are ‘second-class’ representatives (Lundberg 2007b: 3-4). There is also the broader question 
of what kind of constituency role should be played by regional members. Constituency 
service in Scotland and Wales has been explored by a number of studies (Bradbury and 
Mitchell 2007; Bradbury and Russell 2005; Carman and Shephard 2007; Cowley and Lochore 
2000; Lundberg 2007b; McCabe and McCormick 2000). Self-reported estimates of how time 
is allocated show that constituency MSPs and AMs spent more of their work time on 
constituency service than did their regional counterparts (Lundberg 2007b: 178-9). This 
difference could be due to rational electoral incentives, as research in Germany has shown 
(Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Lancaster and Patterson 1990), though personal reasons, 
such as simply the enjoyment of constituency service, could also be at work.  
 20 
While MMP got caught up in bitter partisan competition between the SNP and Labour 
in Scotland (Lundberg 2014), the system also ran into controversy in Wales, where dual 
candidacy became so unpopular with Labour that the practice was banned for 2007 and 2011 
elections to the National Assembly (though not for the Scottish Parliament or London 
Assembly), with the ban only rescinded when the Conservative/Liberal Democrat government 
at Westminster abolished it with the passage of the Wales Act 2014. There was no ban 
initially, with Labour candidates standing as dual candidates in Wales before 2007, but Welsh 
Secretary Peter Hain claimed that candidates losing constituency races but winning via 
regional lists had been ‘rejected by the voters’ and should not be allowed to enter the 
Assembly (Lundberg 2007b: 164). The UK Electoral Commission found no evidence 
supporting the Hain’s assertion that the public disapproved of the dual candidacy and argued 
that the likely beneficiaries of the ban would be constituency (mainly Labour) incumbents 
because opposition parties would probably place their best candidates on the regional lists, 
leaving the constituency races to sacrificial lambs (UK Electoral Commission 2005: 5-6).  
Labour’s complaints about dual candidacy appeared to be based on partisan self-
interest, according to the Conservative Welsh Secretary and nearly everyone else outside the 
Labour Party who commented on the plans to rescind the ban (Roberts 2013), although 
Labour’s ideology also lends itself to a zero-sum view of representation and a majoritarian 
view of democracy uneasy about political pluralism and incompatible with the positive-sum 
logic of PR (Lundberg 2007b: 164-5). Aside from Labour, no party opposed the UK 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government’s abolition of the dual candidacy ban in 
the Wales Act 2014, making the practice legal once again for National Assembly elections 
from 2016. 
Labour should be given credit, however, for the large proportion of female members 
of the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales (relative to the female proportion 
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of members of the House of Commons). This achievement was not so much a result of PR, 
but rather to Labour’s ‘twinning’ procedures used in the single-member constituency 
component of MMP in which the party would match pairs of constituencies that seemed 
equally winnable, with one getting a female candidate (Russell et al. 2002: 56). Labour’s 
success at winning constituency seats – a feature of the early years of devolution, particularly 
in Scotland – meant that many women were elected. For the 1999 elections, the SNP rejected 
formal use of a ‘zipping’ procedure to alternate male and female candidates on regional party 
lists, but did informally encourage the placing of female candidates higher up the lists so that 
nearly half of the party’s elected regional members were women; Plaid used a similar 
approach in Wales with similar results (Russell et al. 2002: 60-62). Contentious as these 
efforts were for all parties – legal action was actually taken against Labour’s efforts on 
grounds of sex discrimination – the result was a big increase in female representation. 
 
Conclusion: Continuity in the face of change 
The UK had six different electoral systems operating at various levels of governance in the 
early twenty-first century. While the House of Commons resisted reform attempts in the late 
twentieth century, the new institutions and positions created by devolution allow for a study 
of the interaction of different electoral and party systems. Although there has been some 
interaction between the different levels of governance in the UK since devolution that has 
affected Westminster – most notably in the decline of Scottish Labour and the rise of the SNP, 
which won 56 of Scotland’s 59 seats in the House of Commons, replacing the Liberal 
Democrats as the UK’s third-largest party in 2015 – there has been little ‘bottom-up’ impact.  
Despite its use at several levels of UK governance, PR had not captured the British 
public’s imagination, and the likelihood of a shift from SMP to PR for the House of 
Commons appeared low (Renwick 2009), even though it is likely that SMP ‘has lost the battle 
of ideas’ (Blais and Shugart 2008: 206), with partisan interests overcoming most people’s 
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idea of electoral system fairness. While the Labour Party did introduce new electoral systems 
in the late twentieth century, the party failed to embrace the pluralism of party politics that 
accompanied these institutional reforms, perhaps being prevented from doing so by the 
majoritarian mentality permeating both major parties in the UK. With both the Conservatives 
and Labour apparently against change for the House of Commons, a third wave of electoral 
reform seemed unlikely. 
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Table 1: Electoral systems in use in the UK in early twenty-first century 
Majoritarian Proportional 
Single-member plurality  Single transferable vote 
Block vote Regional list proportional representation 
Supplementary vote Mixed-member proportional representation 
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Table 2: House of Commons elections   
A. 6 May 2010 
Party   % Votes Seats won   % Seats 
Conservative      36.1      307      47.2 
Labour      29.0      258      39.7 
Liberal Democrat      23.0        57        8.8 
UK Independence        3.1          0           0 
British National        1.9          0           0 
Scottish National        1.7          6        0.9 
Green        1.0          1        0.2 
Sinn Fein        0.6          5        0.8 
Democratic Unionist        0.6          8        1.2 
Plaid Cymru        0.6          3        0.5 
Social Democratic and Labour        0.4          3        0.5 
Alliance        0.1          1        0.2 
Total (including Speaker seeking re-election)       650  
•Voter turnout: 65.1% 
•Women elected: 143 (22.0%) 
•Effective number of parliamentary parties: 2.6 
•Index of disproportionality (Michael Gallagher’s Least Squares): 14.9 
B. 7 May 2015 
Party   % Votes Seats won   % Seats 
Conservative      36.9      331      50.9 
Labour      30.4      232      35.7 
UK Independence      12.6          1        0.2 
Liberal Democrat        7.9          8        1.2 
Scottish National        4.7        56        8.6 
Green        3.8          1        0.2 
Democratic Unionist        0.6          8        1.2 
Plaid Cymru        0.6          3        0.5 
Sinn Fein        0.6          4        0.6 
Ulster Unionist        0.4          2        0.3 
Social Democratic and Labour        0.3          3        0.5 
Total (including Speaker seeking re-election)       650  
•Voter turnout: 66.1% 
•Women elected: 191 (29.4%) 
•Effective number of parliamentary parties: 2.5 
•Index of disproportionality (Michael Gallagher’s Least Squares): 15.0 
Sources: BBC News (2010; 2015) 
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Table 3: London borough elections, 22 May 2014 
A. Barking and Dagenham 
Party   % Votes Seats won   % Seats 
Labour 69.1 51 100.0 
UK Independence 15.4   0        0 
Conservative   9.9   0        0 
Liberal Democrat   1.7   0        0 
Total  51  
•Voter turnout: 36.5% 
•Women elected: 20 (39.2%) 
•Effective number of parliamentary parties: 1.0 
•Index of disproportionality (Michael Gallagher’s Least Squares): 25.4 
B. Tower Hamlets 
Party   % Votes Seats won   % Seats 
Labour 38.6 22 48.9 
Tower Hamlets First 34.9 18 40.0 
Conservative 12.1   5 11.1 
Green   6.3   0      0 
Liberal Democrat   3.2   0      0 
UK Independence   2.9   0      0 
Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition   1.2   0      0 
Total  45  
•Voter turnout: 47.2% 
•Women elected: 11 (24.4%) 
•Effective number of parliamentary parties: 2.4 
•Index of disproportionality (Michael Gallagher’s Least Squares): 9.8 
Sources: Barking and Dagenham (2014); Tower Hamlets (2014) 
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Table 4: London Mayor election, 5 May 2016 











Sadiq Khan Labour       44.2       17.5           56.8 
Zac Goldsmith Conservative       35.0       11.3           43.2 
Sian Berry Green         5.8       21.2  
Caroline Pidgeon Liberal Democrat         4.6       15.2  
Peter Whittle UK Independence         3.6       10.1  
Sophie Walker Women’s Equality         2.0         9.0  
George Galloway Respect 1.4         5.3  
Paul Golding Britain First 1.2         3.3  
•Voter turnout: 45.3% 
Sources: BBC News (2016a); London Elects (2016)  
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Table 5: Northern Ireland Assembly election, 5 May 2016 
Party   % 1st preference vote    Seats won     % Seats won 
Democratic Unionist                 29.2          38           35.2 
Sinn Fein                 24.0          28           25.9 
Ulster Unionist                 12.6          16           14.8 
Social Democratic and Labour                 12.0          12           11.1 
Alliance                   7.0            8             7.4 
Traditional Unionist Voice                   3.4            1             0.9 
Green                   2.7            2             1.9 
People Before Profit Alliance                   2.0            2             1.9 
Total (including an independent)         108  
•Voter turnout: 54.2% 
•Women elected: 30 (27.5%) 
•Effective number of parliamentary parties: 4.3 
•Index of disproportionality (Michael Gallagher’s Least Squares): 5.1 
Source: BBC News (2016b)   
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Table 6: European Parliament members elected from Great Britain, 22 May 2014 
Party      % Vote Seats % Seats 
UK Independence         27.5 24 34.3 
Labour         25.4 20 28.6 
Conservative         23.9 19 27.1 
Green           7.9   3   4.3 
Liberal Democrat           6.9   1   1.4 
Scottish National           2.5   2   2.9 
English Democrat   1.8   0     0 
An Independence From Europe   1.4   0     0 
British National   1.1   0     0 
Socialist Labour   1.1   0     0 
No2EU   1.0   0     0 
Plaid Cymru   0.7   1   1.4 
Total  70  
•UK-wide voter turnout: 34.2% 
•Women elected (GB + NI): 41% 
•Effective number of parliamentary parties: 3.6 
•Index of disproportionality (Michael Gallagher’s Least Squares): 7.7 
Source: BBC News (2014)   
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Table 7: Scottish Parliament elections 
A. 5 May 2011 








Total seats % Seats 
Scottish National         44.0      16          45.4          53        69    53.5 
Labour        26.3      22          31.7          15        37    28.7 
Conservative        12.4      12          13.9            3        15    11.6 
Liberal Democrat          5.2        3            7.9            2          5      3.9 
Greens          4.4        2 - -          2      1.6 
All Scotland 
Pensioners 
         1.7        0            0.1            0          0         0 
Total (including an 
independent) 
      56           73      129  
•Voter turnout: 51.1% 
•Women elected: 45 (34.9%) 
•Effective number of parliamentary parties: 2.6 
•Index of disproportionality (Michael Gallagher’s Least Squares): 7.4 
B. 5 May 2016 








Total seats % Seats 
Scottish National         41.7        4          46.5          59        63    48.8 
Conservative        22.9      24          22.0            7        31    24.0 
Labour        19.1      21          22.6            3        24    18.6 
Greens          6.6        6            0.6            0          6      4.7 
Liberal Democrat          5.2        1            7.8            4          5      3.9 
UK Independence          2.0        0 - -          0         0 
Total       56           73      129  
•Voter turnout: 55.6% 
•Women elected: 45 (34.9%) 
•Effective number of parliamentary parties: 3.0 
•Index of disproportionality (Michael Gallagher’s Least Squares): 5.5 




Table 8: National Assembly for Wales elections  
A. 5 May 2011 








Total seats % Seats 
Labour        36.9        2          42.3          28        30    50.0 
Conservative        22.5        8          25.0            6        14    23.3 
Plaid Cymru        17.9        6          19.3            5        11    18.3 
Liberal Democrat          8.0        4          10.6            1          5      8.3 
UK Independence          4.6        0            1.8            0          0         0 
Greens          3.4        0            0.2            0          0         0 
British National          2.4        0            0.7            0          0         0 
Socialist Labour          2.4        0              -            0          0  
Total       20           40        60  
•Voter turnout: 42.2% 
•Women elected: 25 (41.7%) 
•Effective number of parliamentary parties: 2.9 
•Index of disproportionality (Michael Gallagher’s Least Squares): 10.4 
B. 5 May 2016 








Total seats % Seats 
Labour        31.5        2          34.7          27        29    48.3 
Plaid Cymru        20.8        6          20.5            6        12    20.0 
Conservative        18.8        5          21.1            6        11    18.3 
UK Independence        13.0        7          12.5            0          7    11.7 
Liberal Democrat          6.5        0            7.7            1          1      1.7 
Abolish the Welsh 
Assembly 
         4.4        0 -            0          0         0 
Greens          3.0        0            2.5            0          0         0 
Total       20           40        60  
•Voter turnout: 45.3% 
•Women elected: 25 (41.7%) 
•Effective number of parliamentary parties: 3.1 
•Index of disproportionality (Michael Gallagher’s Least Squares): 13.0 
Sources: BBC News (2011b; 2016d)  
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